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NOTES

TORT

LAW: PROTECTION OF PRENATAL
WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTES-CRITIQUE OF

nett, 111 N.J. 412, 545 A.2d 139 (1988).
I.

LIFE

THROUGH

Giardina v. Ben-

INTRODUCTION

If the mother can die and the fetus live, or the fetus die
and the mother live, how can it be said that there is only one
life? If tortious conduct can injure one and not the other, how
can it be said that there is not a duty owing to each?'

Administrators attempting to bring wrongful death actions on behalf of parents whose fetuses are stillborn as a result of prenatal injury

have encountered various and everchanging judicial responses over the
past several decades. Since the California Appellate Court, in Scott v.
McPheeters, recognized fetuses as separate beings apart from their
mothers,' courts have been increasingly willing to protect the rights of
the unborn.' However, a minority of courts still refuse to recognize the
widely accepted view that a wrongful death action may be maintained

on behalf of a stillborn infant. 4

This casenote reviews Giardina v. Bennett,5 the New Jersey Supreme Court's recent denial of a right to bring a wrongful death action
I. O'Neill v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 135-37, 188 N.W.2d 785, 787-88 (1971).
2. 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 630, 92 P.2d 678, 679, appeal denied, 33 Cal. App. 2d
640, 93 P.2d
562 (1939) ("[A] child conceived, but not yet born, is to be deemed an existing
person, so far as
may be necessary for its interests in the event of its subsequent birth.").
3. See Eich v. Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 97, 300 So. 2d 354, 355 (1974) (holding
that it
would be illogical to allow recovery for a child who is injured prenatally and survives
but not to
allow recovery when that child's twin is stillborn); Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C.
608, 138 S.E.2d
42 (1964) (allowing an action for injuries suffered by a fetus after it reaches viability).
See generally F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.3 (Supp. 1968); W. PROSSER,
THE LAW OF
TORTS § 55 (4th ed. 1971).
4. Approximately 14 states refuse to recognize a right to maintain a wrongful
death action
on behalf of a fetus who is injured prenatally and is subsequently stillborn. See.
e.g., Justus v.
Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977); Stokes v. Liberty
Mut. Ins.
Co., 213 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1968).
5. I11 N.J. 412, 545 A.2d 139 (1988).
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on behalf of a fetus.6 The conflicts between the Giardinaruling and the
current majority rule will be discussed, followed by an analysis of
whether Giardinaevidences a reversal in the current trend toward recognition of wrongful death actions on behalf of fetuses.
II.'

FACTS AND HOLDING

In October, 1982, Regina Giardina was informed by the defendant, Gardiner Bennett, her obstetrician and gynecologist, that she was
pregnant and that her due date was May 19, 1983.1 Giardina received
regular examinations by defendant and his staff during the course of
her pregnancy. 8 On June 3, 1983, when Giardina was more than two
9
weeks overdue, defendant performed a "non-stress test" and reported:
10
to Giardina that it had not revealed any problems.
Over the next nine days, plaintiff experienced intermittent pain
and contractions and was examined by defendant twice.' Bennett considered her symptoms common and allegedly refused to perform a caesarean section.1 2 Late on June 12, 1983, plaintiff was ordered to proceed to the hospital when her contractions were three minutes apart."
Shortly after she was admitted, the hospital staff discovered that there
that the baby was
was no fetal heartbeat, and defendant confirmed
4
afternoon.'
next
the
dead. It was stillborn
On June 11, 1985, the Giardinas filed a wrongful death action
against the defendant and other hospital staff members alleging that
defendant's treatment deviated from accepted standards of medical
care. 5 They sought compensatory damages for the infant and damages
for its "'conscious pain and suffering' prior to death."'" The complaint
17
was brought under New Jersey's Wrongful Death Statute, and was a

6. Id. Facts are as alleged by plaintiff, absent full adjudication.
7. Id. at 414, 545 A.2d at 140.
8. Id.
9. A "non-stress test" is a procedure performed just prior to delivery of a child to determine
if the fetus is undergoing any type of problem such as increased heart rate. If the fetus was dead
at the time the test was performed, the doctor would have been aware of that fact. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. A "caesarean section" is a medical procedure whereby an incision is made in a
woman's abdomen and the child is removed through that incision rather than being born
vaginally.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 31-1 (West 1987) states that:
When the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default, such as would,
if death had not ensued, have entitled the person injured to maintain an action for damages
resulting from the injury, the person who would have been liable in damages for the injury
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direct challenge to the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Graf v.

Taggart.18 In Graf, the court denied a wrongful death claim brought in

response to the pre-birth death of an infant. 9 On June 6, 1986, the
Giardina v. Bennett2" court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment and plaintiff appealed." The appellate division summarily affirmed and the New Jersey Supreme Court granted plaintiff's petition

for certification.2

The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the Giardinas did not
have a claim under the wrongful death statute because a fetus which
dies before birth is not a person.23 In addition, the parents can protect
their own interests by bringing a medical malpractice action against

the defendant for direct infliction of injury upon themselves, and for

emotional distress and mental suffering. 4 Chief Justice Handler, in a
unanimous decision, cited legislative intent as a means to rule that the

act was not meant to include a fetus which is stillborn.

5

The act refers

specifically to the wrongful death of a "person. 2 6 When the act was
passed in 1877, New Jersey and most other jurisdictions generally did
not consider a fetus to be a person, for legislative purposes.2 7 In addition, the common law treated an unborn child as being "merely part of
his mother without separate existence or personality. '28 In reviewing
the history of the common law regarding pre-birth injuries, the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Smith v. Brennan2 9 recited a string of cases 30
in which the courts had decided that "a child before birth is, in fact, a
part of the mother and is only severed from her at birth .... "31 The

if death had not ensued shall be liable in an action for damages, notwithstanding the death
of the person injured and although the death was caused under circumstances amounting in
law to a crime.
Id.
18. 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964).
19. Id.
20. I11 N.J. 412, 545 A.2d 139 (1988).
21. Id. at 415, 545 A.2d at 140.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 420, 545 A.2d at 143.
24. Id.
25. Id. "The language, legislative history, and subsequent treatment of the Act and analogous statutory schemes counsel against interpreting the Act to cover the death of a fetus." Id.
26. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:3 1-1 ("When the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act").
27. Giardina, Ill N.J. at 422, 545 N.E.2d at 144.
28. See Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 356, 157 A.2d 497, 498 (1960) (discussing common
law treatment of the unborn); see also Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 17
(1884) (wrongful death statute inapplicable to fetus, as it was considered to have no existence
separate from its mother). But see Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 352 Mass. 446, 448, 225
N.E.2d 926, 927 (1982) (nonviability of a fetus does not bar recovery in a wrongful death action).
29. 31 N.J. at 353, 157 A.2d at 497.
30. Id. at 357, 157 A.2d at 499.
31. Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 II1. 359, 368, 56 N.E. 638, 640 (1900), overruled,

Published by eCommons, 1989

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 15:1

Giardina court reasoned that when the legislature wanted to include a
s2
fetus in a statute, it utilized specific wording. Therefore, since the

legislature did not use specific wording in the wrongful death statute, it
a3
must have meant to exclude a fetus.
III.
A.

BACKGROUND

Wrongful Death Action Nonexistent at Common Law

At common law it was the rule that an action could not be main4
tained for the wrongful death of a decedent. Recovery came only af35
ter statutory survival and wrongful death enactments, which now exist in all fifty states." These were enacted to counter the common law
rule by providing recovery for a person's death when recovery under
the common law was specifically denied. There were two primary reasons for the enactment of survival and wrongful death statutes: when
the law provides for an action for negligence when the victim survives a
tort, it should also provide for recovery when the tort is so severe as to
cause death; and when a tortfeasor's negligence causes the death of
someone's spouse, parent, etc., that loss should be one that is compensated.3 7 These reasons, together with simple logical considerations of

recovery for infants in many other situations, support the development

of wrongful death actions on behalf of fetuses as well.
In general, wrongful death statutes were designed to allow recovery for the death of a decedent where, had the decedent survived, he
would have been able to bring an action for the wrong committed
against him.3 8 However, the wrongful death statutes vary as to specific

Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953).
32. Giardina, 111 N.J. at 421, 545 N.E.2d at 143. New Jersey Workers' Compensation
Statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-13(f) (West 1988), enacted in 1911, specifically provides that "a
child in esse" can be a dependent. Id. A "child in esse" is a child actually in existence after birth.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 698 (5th ed. 1979). In the New Jersey Uniform Anatomical Gift
Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:6-57(b) (West 1987), a "decedent" is defined as "a deceased individual
and includes a stillborn infant or fetus." id.
33. Giardina, 111 N.J. at 421, 545 A.2d at 154.
34. Carey v. Berkshire R.R., 55 Mass. (I Cush.) 475 (1848) (Massachusetts court was the
first United States jurisdiction to adopt that common law rule), overruled, Gaudette v. Webb, 362
Mass. 60, 284 N.E.2d 222 (1972); see also Commonwealth v. Boston & L.R. Corp., 134 Mass.
211 (1883).
35. "Survival statutes" provide a survivor with the same right to bring an action that the
decedent would have had if he/she had survived. "Wrongful death statutes" provide a separate
cause of action brought by an administrator of the deceased's estate on behalf of the survivors.
See Note, The Estate of an Unborn Child Has a Cause of Action for Wrongful Death - O'Neill v.
Morse, 70 MICH. L. REv. 729, 733-34 (1972).
36. See S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 1:3 (1966) (collecting and comparing statutes).
37. See Note, supra note 35, at 733.
38. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:31-6 (West 1987).
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provisions, such as, eligible beneficiaries and types and amounts of
damages. 9 These differences play a part in determining whether the
wrongful death statutes should be applicable to fetuses.' 0
B. Lower Courts' Varying Interpretationsof Wrongful Death Acts in
Relation to Fetuses
In the past thirty years, many lower courts 1 have reversed themselves in their interpretation of wrongful death statutes. The position of
a minority of states, allowing wrongful death actions brought on behalf
of a fetus in 1959,42 has become a majority position in 1989.' 3
1. Majority Rule
At least twenty three states' 4 and the District of Columbia allow
administrators of the estates of stillborn children to bring actions for
the benefit of the parents of fetuses who are injured prenatally and are

39. See S. SPEISER, supra note 36, § 11:16, at 636-37. For example, some statutes limit
recovery to pecuniary loss. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.090 (Vernon 1988) states in part:
In every action brought under section 537.080, the trier of the facts may give to the
party or parties entitled thereto suchdamages as the trier of the facts may deem fair and
just for the death and loss thus occasioned, having regard to the pecuniary losses suffered
by reason of the death, funeral expenses,, and the reasonable value of the services, consortium . . . and support of which those on whose behalf suit may be brought have been
deprived by reason of such death and without limiting such damages to those which, would
be sustained prior to attaining the age of majority by the deceased or by the person suffering any such loss.
Id.
Other statutes allow recovery of extensive damages. For example, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.130
(Baldwin 1987) states in part:
(1)Whenever the death of a person results from an injury inflicted by the negligence
or wrongful act of another, damages may be recovered for the death from the person who
caused it, or whose agent or servant caused it. If the act was willful or the negligence gross,
punitive damages may be recovered.
Id. 40. See infra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., O'Neill v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 188 N.W.2d 785 (1971), overruling Estate
of Powers v. City of Troy, 380 Mich. 160, 156 N.W.2d 530 (1968); O'Grady v. Brown, 654
S.W.2d 904 (Mo. 1983), overrulingState ex rel. Hardin v. Sanders, 538 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1976);
Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924 (Okla. 1976), overruling Howell v. Rushing, 261 P.2d 217 (Okla.
1953).
42. See Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 432-33, 167 N.E.2d 106, 107 (1959) (discussing rulings in other jurisdictions which did not allow wrongful death actions on behalf of
stillborn fetuses).
43. See, e.g., Gorke v. Le Clerc, 23 Conn. Supp. 256, 181 A.2d 448 (1962); Maniates v.
Grant Hosp., 15 Ill. App. 3d 903, 305 N.E.2d 422 (1973). See generally Annotation, Right to
Maintain Action or to Recover Damages for Death of Unborn Child, 84 A.L.R.3d 411, 422
(1978) (reviewing states' rulings regarding wrongful death actions on behalf of stillborn fetuses).
44. Ala., Conn., Del., Ga., Ill., Ind., Kan., Ky., La., Md., Mass., Mich., Minn., Miss., Nev.,
N.H., Ohio, Okla., Or., R.I., S.C., Wash., W. Va.. Annotation, supra note 43, at 422.
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subsequently stillborn. Of these, only Georgia"' and Rhode Island"' al-

low recovery for an injury to a fetus which occurs before the fetus
reaches viability. The remaining states recognize the right to bring an

action for wrongful death for fetal injuries which occur after the fetus

reaches viability."7
The growing recognition of the legal rights of fetuses has resulted
from developments in many areas of the law, such as, tort and guardianship. Wrongful death statutes were initially enacted in the late
1800's, when it was not even considered that a fetus might be a sepa49
rate being from its mother.4 In Dietrich v. Northampton, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court denied recovery to the personal repre5
sentative of a child who died at birth from prenatal injuries. " The
1884 decision rested on the concept that before birth a child is merely
5
part of his mother without separate existence or personality. ' In the
late 1800's, tort actions for prenatal injuries could not be maintained
5" However, by 1940, this trend in the
even if the child did survive.
53
courts began to change.
55
Beginning with California54 and the District of Columbia, courts

throughout the country initiated the trend toward recognizing prenatal
life. Prosser, a recognized torts scholar, noted that the retreat from the
Dietrich position was "up till that time the most spectacular abrupt

45. Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955) (recognizing "quick" child).
46. Presley v. Newport Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 365 A.2d 748 (1976).
47. "The term 'viable' refers to the point in prenatal development at which time a fetus is
capable of independent existence if removed from the mother's womb. It has often been stated
that a fetus ordinarily becomes viable between the twenty-fourth and twenty-eighth weeks of the
pregnancy." Werling v. Sandy, 17 Ohio St. 3d 45 n.1,476 N.E.2d 1053 n.1 (1985). However,
since the United States Supreme Court's decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109
S. Ct. 3040 (interim ed. 1989), that figure may be pushed up to as far as 20 weeks gestational
age. Since recognizing the wrongful death action from injuries occurring before viability is the
exception, and because of the difficulty in supporting that rule, this note will focus on the rule
which requires a fetus to reach viability.
48. See Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 17.
51. Id.; see also Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 356, 157 A.2d 497, 498 (1960) (discussing
common law treatment of the unborn).
52. Dietrich, 138 Mass. at 15; see also Newman v. City of Detroit, 281 Mich. 60, 274
N.W.710 (1937), overruled, Womack v. Buchhorn, 384 Mich. 718, 187 N.W.2d 218 (1971). The
court in Newman denied recovery for the death of a child that survived three months after birth
and died from injuries suffered 22 days prior to birth when his mother was a passenger on a
Detroit streetcar. See Newman, 281 Mich. at 62, 64, 274 N.W. at 711.
53. See Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946); Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal.
App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d 678, appeal denied, 33 Cal. App. 2d 640, 93 P.2d 562 (1939).
54. Scott, 33 Cal. App. 2d at 629, 92 P.2d at 678.
55. Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. at 138.
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reversal of a well settled rule in the whole history of the law of torts." 56
The trend continued with courts recognizing prenatal rights in the areas of tort57 and guardianship law. 58 By 1960, many courts declared
that prior to birth, an unborn child has an existence separate and apart
from its mother.5 9 For example, in Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit
Inc.,6" the Ohio Supreme Court recognized a cause of action for a child
who became crippled for life due to a prenatal injury, caused by the
negligence of another.6 1 The rationale of Williams was that an unborn
viable child is capable of an existence independent of its mother, and
that as the law recognizes an unborn child by protecting its property
rights, the law should also recognize its civil rights for the infliction of
injury due to negligence.62
Many of these courts simultaneously determined that a wrongful
death action could be brought on behalf of a fetus. Ohio was in the
minority when an appellate court first recognized a wrongful death action on behalf of a stillborn fetus in Stidam v. Ashmore 3 in 1959. In
Stidam, the Ohio Court of Appeals for Madison County determined
that the administratrix of a stillborn fetus' estate may maintain a
wrongful death action on behalf of an infant when the defendant's negligence caused a prenatal injury and the fetus was subsequently stillborn. 4 The Ohio Supreme Court, in Werling v. Sandy, 5 reinforced
that ruling in 1985 by deciding that a wrongful death action could be
brought on behalf of a viable fetus injured prenatally and subsequently
stillborn. 6
In 1973, the United States Supreme Court, in the landmark case
Roe v. Wade,6 7 confirmed the trend by recognizing that once a fetus

56. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 55 (4th ed. 1971).
57. Womack v. Buckhorn, 384 Mich. 718, 187 N.W.2d 218 (1971) (allowing recovery by
an eight year old child suffering from brain injuries sustained during the fourth month of his
mother's pregnancy).
58. See MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2045 (West 1981) (providing that if a person not in
being may be entitled to a property interest involved in a proceeding and that unborn person's
interests are not able to be represented, a guardian ad litem may be appointed for the unborn
person).
59. See, e.g., Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334
(1949).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959).
64. Id.at 435, 167 N.E.2d at 108.
65. 17 Ohio St. 3d 45, 476 N.E.2d 1053 (1985).
66. Id.
67. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In a challenge to a state statute criminalizing abortion, the United
States Supreme Court held that the states could outlaw only those abortions performed after the
fetus reaches viability because that is when the state begins to have an interest in the welfare of
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68
becomes viable the state has an interest in the life of the fetus. The
Court explained that "[sitate regulation protective of fetal life after
9
viability . . . has both logical and biological justifications." In Webster
7 the Supreme Court furthered this
v. Reproductive Health Services,
recognition by upholding a Missouri statute's preamble which states
that life begins at conception. 1 The Court held that it is permissible to
72
offer protections to unborn children in tort and probate law. Many
73 have adopted the majority rule of recognizing wrongful death
states
actions brought on behalf of fetuses who are stillborn.

2.. Minority Rule
The New Jersey' Supreme Court has refused to recognize the
many factors which make the protections of the prenatal life compelling, and has rejected the majority approach. It clings, with the minority, to the legislative intent without looking to society's need for court
interference when the legislature has not acted. A shrinking minority of
states 7 ' continue to adhere to the interpretation that a wrongful death
action is not maintainable 'for the unborn child's death, even if the
of an unborn child is theresult of injuries sustained after viabildeath
ity.7 5 Most of these rulings are based on the legislative intent not to
include a fetus as a "person" capable of recovery at the time the statutes were enacted. 76 In comparing workers' compensation and organ
donation statutes, the word fetus or unborn child is used when the statute is specifically intended to apply to fetuses* Consequently, the minority jurisdictions feel that the legislatures" failure to use one of these
specific terms in wrongful death statutes evidences their intent to exclude fetuses from protection. 7 The inconsistencies of this logic will be

the child. Id. at 163.
68. Id. at 163.
69. Id.
70. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (interim ed. 1989).
71. Id. at 3042.
72. Id.
73. See S.SPEISER, supra note 36, at 778-1004.
74. See Annotation, supra note 43, at 424-30 (discussing states which still do not recognize
a wrongful death action on behalf of a still-born infant).
75. Id.
76. Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 483, 248 N.E.2d 901, 903, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65, 69
(1969) (although the statute, as enacted in 1847, was silent on the subject, it was fairly certain
that the legislature did not intend to include an unborn fetus within the term "decedent"); see
also McKillip v. Zimmerman, 191 N.W.2d 706, 709 (Iowa 1971) (holding that the legislature did
not intend to include an unborn fetus when it adopted a survival statute referring to the death of a
"person").
77. See Bayer v. Suttle, 23 Cal. App. 3d 361, 100 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1972). In that case the
court used another statute to interpret the Wrongful Death Statute. Id. at 364, 100 Cal. Rptr. at
214. The other statute provided that a child conceived, but not yet born, was to be deemed an
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discussed later in this note.78

IV.

ANALYSIS

In Giardina v. Bennett,7 the New Jersey Supreme Court is very
specific about the grounds on which their decision is based. "The language, legislative history, and subsequent treatment of the Act and
analogous statutory schemes counsel against interpreting the Act to
cover the death of a fetus. Further, the availability of a common-law
action that satisfactorily accomodates the interests that are implicated
supports this conclusion." 8 0 In taking this rigid approach to the problem, however, the court fails to recognize the inconsistent and illogical
results which follow. Fetuses are now recognized as being separate persons from their mothers when they become viable, and the intent of the
wrongful death act would be furthered by allowing actions on behalf of
stillborn infants.
A.

Fetus Now Recognized as Separatefrom Mother

One of the two major premises for the Giardina ruling is that
when the legislature adopted the.Wrongful Death Act in 1877, a fetus
was not recognized as having a separate existence from its mother.8 1
"[T]he common law . . . treated an unborn child as being 'merely a
part of his mother without separate existence or personality.' "82 The
Giardina court thus reasoned "that the Legislature adopted this common-law understanding of the concept of a 'person' in the adoption of
the Wrongful Death Act."' * The court explained that in other statutes,
such as those for workers' compensation, where fetuses were to be protected, the legislature used the specific term. 8 ' However, at least one of
the civil statutes referred to8" was enacted long before there was widespread recognition that a fetus had a separate existence.
In addition, the fact that a subsequent legislature uses the proper
wording in a completely different statute does not create an assumption
that it has gone through all former statutes to correct the term in
others. Giardina ignores the fact that by 1973, the United States Suexisting person, so far as its interests were concerned in the event of its subsequent birth. Id. The
court reasoned that there would have been no need for that specification if a fetus were already
considered a "person" under the law. Id.
78. See infra text accompanying notes 82-99.
79. I11N.J. 412, 545 A.2d 139 (1988).
80. Id. at 420, 545 A.2d at 143.
81. Id. at 421, 545 A.2d at 143.
82. Id. (quoting Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 356, 157 A.2d 497, 498 (1960)).
83. Id. at 421, 545 A.2d at 143.
84. Id.
85. New Jersey Workers' Compensation Act, N.J. REV. STAT. § 34:15-13(f) (1911).
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preme Court recognized that the state had an interest in viable fetuses.
The Court, in Roe v. Wade,86 made this determination only after careful examination of the medical, scientific and social considerations surrounding the issue. The decision that a viable fetus does have importance therefore has a strong basis in fact and logic. This recognition
must override the intent of some long past legislature which, 112 years
ago, understood that a fetus was not viable until birth.
Other states have reconsidered the scope of their wrongful death
statutes in light of technological developments. Indiana enacted a
Wrongful Death Statute in 1881,87 just four years after New Jersey
passed its wrongful death statute. The Indiana appellate court, in Britt
v. Sears,88 concluded that since actions for prenatal injuries and deaths
were unknown when the statute was enacted, the legislators very likely
gave no thought to whether they were prohibiting an action for prena8 9 Because the
tal injury or death by not including the term "fetus."
New Jersey legislature did not specifically exclude fetuses from the
wrongful death act,9" and because New Jersey's act was passed before
Indiana's, one may infer that the New Jersey legislature just did not
consider fetuses at all, and therefore never intended to exclude them
from the wrongful death act. Thus courts must fill in the gaps where
the legislature could not address certain conditions because those conditions did not exist at the time the legislature considered the law.
The nature of the judicial system is to interpret the statutory law
91
and to apply it in a way which recognizes the current state of society.
9 2 the Michigan Supreme Court recognized
In Womack v. Buchhorn,
that since a previous Michigan case 93 ruled against recovery for prenatal torts in 1937, "medical science has probably advanced more in one
94
generation than in the previous 100 years or more." In contending
that case law must develop with that scientific knowledge, the Womack
court quoted a New York court 95 which had overruled precedent

86. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
87. See Britt v. Sears, 150 Ind. App. 487, 277 N.E.2d 20 (1971) (recognizing the right for
a father to maintain an action for the wrongful death of a stillborn child where the child was
alleged to have been a full-term, healthy child capable of independent life).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 494, 277 N.E.2d at 24-25.
90. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:31-1 (West 1987).
91. See Womack v. Buchhorn, 384 Mich. 718, 187 N.W.2d 218 (1971) (overruling precedent in Michigan by allowing a right to recovery under negligence for injuries inflicted on a child
prenatally).
92. Id.
93. Newman v. Detroit, 281 Mich. 60, 279 N.W. 710 (1937), overruled, Womack, 384
Mich. at 718, 187 N.W.2d at 218.
94. Womack, 384 Mich. at 720, 187 N.W.2d at 219.
95. See Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951) (although the rule in that
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twenty years earlier by allowing an action for negligent infliction of
prenatal injuries:
"What, then, stands in the way of reversal here?... Of course, rules of
law on which men rely in their business dealings should not be changed
in the middle of the game, but what has that to do with bringing to
justice a tort-feasor who surely has no moral or other right to rely on a
decision of the New York Court of Appeals? . . . Our court said, long
ago, that it had not only the right, but the duty to reexamine a question
where justice demands it .... ""
The Womack court followed this reasoning and- overruled precedent. 97
Similarly, the Giardina court also had a duty to look to the advances in
science, medicine and society and adapt its legal interpretations to
those advancements. When Giardina was decided, a fetus was recognized as a separate being from its mother, 8 and it had been given other
legal rights as well. 99 Therefore, the court should have accepted these
developments and recognized a right to recovery for the wrongful death
of a stillborn fetus. It might be argued that it is excessive judicial activism to interpret the statute'in a way which recognizes a wrongful death
action for a stillborn fetus, and that the matter is better left with the
legislature. However, the courts have always been a means by which
those people who do not have influence with the legislature can force
the law to better respond to the needs of society.1"' In addition, many
laws which have been enacted so long ago tend to be ignored by the
legislature, and "it is often necessary to breath life into existing laws
lest they become stale and shelfworn."' ' Giardina was an opportunity
for the New Jersey Supreme Court to encourage the legislature to act
by recognizing the rights of administrators to bring actions on behalf of
stillborn fetuses, thereby showing the defect in the wrongful death statute as it is'drafted.
B. Intent of Wrongful Death Statutes is Furthered by Allowing Action for Prenatal Injury Resulting in Stillbirth
Because most legislatures did not even consider or discuss the poscase was one of common law and not statute, the principle and duty of the courts remains the
same).
96. Womack, 384 Mich. at 724, 187 N.W.2d at 222 (quoting Woods, 303 N.Y. at 354, 102
N.E.2d at 694).
97. Id. at 725, 187 N.W.2d at 222.
98. See supra notes 3 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
100. See United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1939).
101. Eich v. Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So. 2d 354 (1974) (this liberal attitude comes
from a state which had previously not even recognized a right to bring a negligence action after
birth for injuries sustained prenatally).
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sibility of recovery for stillborn infants in enacting wrongful death statutes,1 02 courts have considerable latitude in determining the question on
the basis of public policy and logic.
1. Public Policy of Wrongful Death Statutes
Wrongful death statutes were enacted based on the theory that if
a tortfeasor's wrongful act is severe enough to cause death, he should
not be rewarded by escaping liability, as he was under the common
law. 103 The statutes were also enacted to compensate the survivors for
the loss of the victim.104 Contrary to the New Jersey Supreme Court's
argument that legislative intent 'Would be violated by allowing a wrongful death action for a fetus, this type of action is essential to the furtherance of legislative intent. Wrongful death actions were enacted partially to instill on tortfeasors the seriousness of their actions. To deny
an administrator recovery when the tort is severe enough to cause
death before birth, rather than.death after birth, would serve to reward
the more severe torts, thereby frustrating the primary intent of the
5
statute. This view is recognized in nearly every state" which recognizes the cause of action.
2.

Not Recognizing the Action Would Create an Absurd Result

Now that the United States Supreme Court has determined that
the state does have an interest in the welfare of a viable fetus,10 6 it is a
better time than ever to recognize the absurdity of the minority rule.
The Roe Court found that the state has an interest in protecting the
life of a viable fetus because that fetus cannot protect itself. 10 7 The test
to demonstrate the existence of the right to bring an action is that the
injury "would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the person injured
to maintain an action for damages resulting from the injury."' 10 8 If
death had not ensued 'for the Giardinas' child, an action would have
been maintainable, regardless of the amount of time that the child had
lived after birth. The absurdity of the result has frequently been illustrated by the following example: " '[s]uppose, for example, viable unborn twins suffered simultaneously the same prenatal injury of which
one died before birth and the other after birth. Shall there be a cause

102.
103.
104.
105.
256, 181
106.
410 U.S.
107.
108.

See, e.g., Britt, 150 Ind. App. at 487, 277 N.E.2d at 20.
See Note, supra note 35, at 731.
Id.
See, e.g., Eich, 293 Ala. at 95, 300 So. 2d at 354; Gorke v. Le Clerc, 23 Conn. Supp.
A.2d 448 (1962).
See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (interim ed. 1989); Roe,
at 113.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:31-1.
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of action for death of the one and not for that of the other?' "109 Surely
the life of each is equally valuable to the parents, the survivors for
which the wrongful death action was intended. Therefore, the result is
absurd because the law would deem the grief to the parents for the
death of one not worthy of recovery, while the grief for the loss of the
other would be worthy of recovery. The parents might be able to bring
a malpractice action, but it would limit the recovery only to damages
for the actual injury to the mother and would allow nothing for the
actual loss of the child.
C. Difficulty. of Proving Damages Should Not Preclude Ability to
Bring Action:
The Giardina court' argued that' since the parents of a stillborn
child could recover under cjommon law' tort remedies for direct infliction of injury, emotional distress and mental suffering,1 1 the wrongful
death action was not necessary. However, there are further damages
awarded by the wrongful death statute which are not compensable
through the common law.
One purpose of the wrongful death statute is to award damages to
the survivor for. the loss. of the !companionship of the decedent."' 'Although the child has not yet been born, many states hold that there has
been' companiohship developed while the child was in the mother's
womb." ' This is especially true where the child is viable and the familycan feel its movements. This loss is not recoverable by the mother
under most tort actions. If the courts have recognized that the companionship does exist, it should be compensated for under the wrongful,
death action even if the loss is of a fetus.
Likewise,' many' wrongful death statutes are' intended to'comfpensate survivors for the loss of earning capacity of the decedent."13 When
a child is a victim of wrongful death, the courts do not preclude recovery because 6f the difficulty in determining future earning capacity." 4
Therefore, the difficulty, in determining the earning capacity of a stillborn child should also not preclude recovery. The same factors that are
used to determine the, loss for a child are available for determining the
loss for a stillborn." 5 This can be- available even for statutes which
109. Werling v. Sandy, 17 Ohio St. 3d 45, 48, 476 N.E.2d 1053, 1055 (1985) (quoting
Stidman v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 434, 167 N.E.2d 106, 108 (1959)).
110. Giardina, 111 N.J. at 413, 545 A.2d at 140.
111. See Note, supra note 35, at 733.
112. See generally A. COLMAN & L. COLMAN, PREGNANCY: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERIENCE (1971).
113. See Note, supra note 35, at 733.
114. Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 365, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (1960).
115. See Note, supra note 35, at 745.

Published by eCommons, 1989

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 15:1

limit recoveries to pecuniary loss." 6
The New Jersey Supreme Court also addresses concerns that other
courts have had with the difficulty of proving viability and causation."'
The New Jersey Supreme Court emphatically states, however, that its
decision in this case is based not on those concerns, but strictly on legislative intent." 8 Even if the court had cited these difficulties as its reasoning, it would not have been saved from an illogical result. The difficulty of proving viability and causation has not precluded children from
9
recovering for injuries sustained while they were fetuses." The same
difficulty exists, and is overcome, in malpractice actions for miscarriage. It would be absurd and illogical to say that this difficulty precludes an administrator from bringing an action on behalf of a fetus for
the same torts, which are so severe that they cause death. Procedurally,
the case will still be dismissed if the plaintiff cannot prove the elements
of the cause of action.
D. Giardina Ruling Should Not Change the Trend in the Courts
Although the New Jersey Supreme Court has definitely attacked,
head-on, the trend which allows wrongful death actions for stillborn
infants, this should not evidence a reversal in that trend. Other courts
have continued to recognize the trend, with the addition of seven
states' " in the last ten years. It is apparent that these states have recognized the logical and practical reasons for allowing public policy to
expand the definition of a "person" in wrongful death legislation.
Courts which have not yet addressed the issue would be wise to consider the Giardina ruling as a fly in the judicial ointment, and not to
follow its inconsistent logic.
V.

CONCLUSION

The New Jersey Supreme Court had decided in Giardina v. Bennett' 2' that nothing has changed which should make the court interpret
the wrongful death statute any differently than when it was enacted

116. O'Neill v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 188 N.W.2d 785 (1971) (noting that under Michigan legislation authorizing recovery for pecuniary injury, parents are entitled to recover for the
net value of their children's services, even if difficult to determine).
117. Giardina, 111 N.J. at 426-27, 545 A.2d at 153.
118. Id.
119. See Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 431, 114 N.E.2d 412, 417 (1953); Smith, 31 N.J. at
365-66, 157 A.2d at 503.
120. See, e.g., Summerfield v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 467, 698 P.2d 712 (1985), overruling Kilmer v. Hicks, 22 Ariz. App. 552, 529 P.2d 706 (1974); Hopkins v. McBane, 359 N.W.2d
862 (N.D. 1984) (recognizing wrongful death action against one whose tortious conduct caused
the death of a viable unborn fetus).
121. 11t N.J. 412, 545 A.2d 139 (1988).
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over one hundred years ago. 122 At that time a fetus was considered to
be simply a part of its mother with no independent existence. 123 Other
rights of the unborn were not recognized at that time either. The court
has stuck its head in the sand by refusing to recognize the developments made in society and the need for the courts to interpret the laws
to serve the needs of that advanced society. The most severe and devastating of torts, those which cause the death of an unborn child, should
not go uncompensated simply because a legislature of a bygone era did
not recognize the status of a fetus,.
Jenifer L. Wilhelm

122.
123.

Id. at 428-29, 545 A.2d at 147.
Id. at 421. 545 A.2d at 143.
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